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FAIR FUNDS AND THE SEC’S COMPENSATION OF INJURED
INVESTORS
Verity Winship*
Abstract 
The Fair Fund provision of Sarbanes-Oxley allows the SEC to
distribute money penalties to injured investors, heralding a new
compensatory role for the agency. The SEC has announced that it will
direct money to injured investors whenever possible, but has not
articulated clear priorities. This Article fills the gap by introducing terms
of debate and proposing a framework for the SEC’s exercise of its
discretion. 
The Article introduces the concept of “public class counsel,” a public
actor that has the dual function of deterrence and victim compensation.
The concept describes—and suggest limits to—the SEC’s role in a system
in which public and private remedies for securities violations increasingly
converge. The Article then draws on the analogy between the “public class
counsel” and the “private attorney general” to propose an answer to the
question: When should the SEC exercise its discretion to create a Fair
Fund? This Article suggests that the SEC focus on distributing penalties
gathered from aiders and abettors of securities fraud because such an
approach would minimize two significant concerns with investor
compensation: first, that compensation of injured investors often amounts
to a transfer of money among equally innocent investors and, second, that
giving the SEC and private actors a role in compensation risks duplication
of costs. 
1
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1. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 75 (2d
Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 75–76.
3. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
4. See Final Judgment as to Monetary Relief at 2, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d
531 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 02-CV-4963), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom/wc
judg070703.pdf.
5. See id.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In one of the largest accounting scandals this decade, WorldCom
announced in June 2002 that it would restate its financials for 2001 and the
first quarter of 2002.  The day after this announcement, the Securities and1
Exchange Commission filed a civil complaint against WorldCom alleging
that the company had overstated its income by $9 billion.  The harm to2
investors—approximately $200 billion —was unprecedented, as was the3
$2.25-billion penalty the Commission obtained.  Although ultimately4
reduced to $750 million in bankruptcy,  the penalty formed part of what5
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox called a “trend” toward large penalties
2
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6. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Secs. and Exch. Comm’n, Statement of Chairman Cox
Concerning Objective Standards for Corporate Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch010406cc.htm. A $10 million penalty against Xerox in 2002
was the largest the SEC had ever imposed against an issuer. SEC v. Xerox Corp., Xerox Settles
SEC Enforcement Action Charging Company with Fraud, Agrees to Pay $10 Million Fine, Restates
Its Financial Results and Conduct Special Review of Its Accounting Controls, Litigation Release
No. 17,465 (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17465.htm. That
amount quickly came to seem like small change—that is what Banc of America Securities paid in
2004 for failing to cooperate with the SEC staff during its investigation. See Stephen M. Cutler,
Director, Div. of Enforcement, Secs. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: 24th Annual Ray
Garrett Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute (Apr. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm; In re Bank of America, Order Instituting
Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 15(b)(4) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making
Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order, Exchange Act Release
No. 49,386 (Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49386.htm; see
also SEC v. Time Warner, Inc., SEC Charges Time Warner With Fraud, Aiding and Abetting
Frauds by Others, and Violating a Prior Cease-and-Desist Order; CFO, Controller, and Deputy
Controller Charged with Causing Reporting Violations, Litigation Release No. 19,147 (Mar. 21,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19147.htm (noting the order to Time
Warner to pay a $300 million penalty). Although the SEC’s discretion to set penalty amounts
makes the size of penalties a moving target, at least for now the penalties continue to be high in
comparison to the SEC’s historical practices. As SEC Chairman Cox testified in May 2008: “In the
17 years since the Congress gave the SEC authority to collect penalties against companies, this
[2007 amount] is the fifth highest penalties and disgorgement total ever, and $1 billion above the
pre-Enron average of the 1990s.” Fiscal 2009 Appropriations: Financial Services: Hearing Before
the Comm. on S. Appropriations Subcomm. on Financial Services and General Government, 110th
Cong. (May 7, 2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n) available
at 2008 WLNR 8763903.
7. See A Price Worth Paying?—Auditing Sarbanes-Oxley, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2005, at
72 (“[The Act’s] original aim, on the face of it, was modest: to improve the accountability of
managers to shareholders, and hence to calm the raging crisis of confidence in American capitalism
aroused by the scandals at Enron, WorldCom and other companies.”); see also James Fanto,
Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: Lessons From Bank Regulation, 58 FLA.
L. REV. 859, 860 (2006) (observing that Sarbanes-Oxley was a “significant intrustion” by the
federal government in corporate governance regulation). See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
8. Section 308 of Sarbanes-Oxley states:
 
and a “sea change . . . in the SEC’s use of its penalty authority . . . .”6
WorldCom—now defunct—became the poster child for the financial
scandals of the beginning of this century, prompting (with Enron) the
Sarbanes-Oxley securities legislation.7
The WorldCom enforcement also served as the testing ground for one
of the novel provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley: the Federal Account for
Investor Restitution (“FAIR”) Funds provision, which allows penalty
money to be directed, at the SEC’s discretion, to injured investors instead
of to the United States Treasury.  As a result of this provision, large8
3
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Civil penalties added to disgorgement funds for the relief of victims. If in any
judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities
laws . . . the Commission obtains an order requiring disgorgement against any
person for a violation of such laws or the rules or regulations thereunder, or such
person agrees in settlement of any such action to such disgorgement, and the
Commission also obtains pursuant to such laws a civil penalty against such
person, the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the direction of
the Commission, be added to and become part of the disgorgement fund for the
benefit of the victims of such violation.
15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006).
9. As of June 2007, $500 million of the $750 million WorldCom Fair Fund had been
distributed. Press Release, SEC, SEC Distributions to WorldCom Fraud Victims Top Half-Billion
Dollar Mark (June 14, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-118.htm (quoting SEC
Chairman Cox as saying that “[i]n the last four years, through this and other SEC distributions, the
Commission has returned nearly $2 billion to investor victims” and that he “anticipate[d]
substantial additional distributions to investors in the near future”).
10. 72 SEC ANN. REP. 23 (2006), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2006.pdf.
Distribution has lagged behind collection. See, e.g., id. (noting that approximately $700 million
were distributed to injured investors during fiscal year 2006). 
11. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces $26 Million Fair Fund Distribution in Banc of
America Securities LLC Settlement (June 23, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
118.htm.
12. See Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?,
63 BUS. LAW. 317, 345 (2008) (examining the impact of Fair Funds on investor protection and
concluding that “effective enforcement policy is not necessarily compatible with a dominant
emphasis on recovering and returning funds to investors”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
with Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 738–42
(2003) (evaluating the potential impact of the Fair Fund provision on investor compensation as part
of an empirical study of private securities fraud class actions); see generally Don Carillo,
Comment, Disgorgement Plans Under the Fair Funds Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002: Are Creditors and Investors Truly Being Protected?, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 315 (2008)
(arguing that courts should review Fair Fund distribution plans under a heightened standard because
penalties in WorldCom’s settlement will potentially result in substantial
distributions by the agency to injured investors.  As the WorldCom9
enforcement matter illustrates, the Fair Fund provision heralded an
increasingly important compensatory role for the SEC. During the
provision’s first four years in effect, the Commission collected
approximately $8 billion in penalties and disgorgement for distribution to
injured investors.  As of June 2008, the SEC had distributed more than10
$3.9 billion.11
Even as WorldCom represented a new scale of harm, it advanced a new
regime of SEC-driven investor compensation. Although couched as a
discretionary distribution mechanism, the Fair Fund provision enabled
investor compensation to gain ground as a significant part of the
Commission’s role. Nonetheless, the SEC’s compensatory role since the
advent of the Fair Fund provision has received limited scholarly
attention,  and the SEC has not articulated clear priorities about how it12
4
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the provision is aimed at compensation rather than deterrence). Other commentators have addressed
the tension between the Fair Fund provision and the bankruptcy provisions that call for the claims
of shareholders to be subordinated to those of creditors, an issue that the WorldCom enforcement
case and bankruptcy brought to the fore. See Zack Christensen, Note, The Fair Funds for Investors
Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: Is It Unfair to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 339, 375 (2005) (arguing that Congress should amend the Fair Fund provision to prevent it
from “alter[ing] the well-established distributional priorities of the Bankruptcy Code”); see
generally Douglas A. Henry, Comment, Subordinating Subordination: WorldCom and the Effect
of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair Funds Provision on Distributions in Bankruptcy, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV.
J. 259 (2004) (arguing that the Fair Fund provision should be applied in bankruptcy to further
congressional intent to compensate investors of securities fraud). 
13. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
will exercise its discretion under the law. This Article proposes the concept
of “public class counsel” to fill these gaps. 
The Fair Fund provision marked an increasing convergence of the
remedies that can be sought by the Commission as “public class counsel”
and by private plaintiffs as “private attorneys general.” In theory, private
damages can promote the general good of securities law enforcement by
deterring violations as well as obtaining compensation for the class of
injured investors. SEC money penalties potentially do the same: they
obtain compensation for the class of injured investors as well as deter. This
Article draws on this analogy between public class counsel and private
attorney general to propose an answer to the following question: When
should the SEC exercise its discretion to create a Fair Fund for investor
compensation? 
Part II elaborates on the analogy between the private attorney general
and public class counsel. Part III traces the emergence of the SEC’s role
in compensating injured investors and examines the Fair Fund provision
in the context of the SEC’s other main compensatory mechanism, the
equitable remedy of disgorgement. Parts IV and V analyze two aspects of
the compensation conundrum: first, whether compensation of injured
investors is ever warranted and, second, when the SEC, as opposed to
private litigants, should undertake it. This Article looks first at the
commonalities between the private attorney general and the public class
counsel, and then to the differences. In doing so, it relates the SEC’s
actions under Fair Funds to the circularity critique of investor
compensation: that, in the secondary market, compensation simply
transfers funds among innocent investors. It also details the costs of
enlarging the SEC’s public class counsel role. Part VI draws on this
analysis to propose a way for the SEC to prioritize Fair Fund distributions
to minimize concerns with circularity and cost duplication. It concludes
that the SEC should focus first on distributing money gathered from aiders
and abettors. Such a focus would minimize concern with circularity.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.  highlights, only the13
5
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14. Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 738–42 (detailing the “public-private partnership for
the enforcement of the securities laws”).
15. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (2006) (expressly providing for
private cause of action); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (recognizing an implied
private cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act). 
16. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding
that Congress can confer standing on private persons, not simply to recover compensation for
specific victims, but also “to vindicate the public interest”), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
17. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee
v. S. Homes Site Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1971); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694
(M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV.
215, 215 & n.1 (1983); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney’s Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 666–70 (1974) (tracing the development of the private attorney general
theory).
18. Coffee, supra note 17, at 215–16. 
19. See id. 
SEC can obtain investor compensation from aiders and abettors because
private litigants have no cause of action.
II.  THE CONCEPT OF “PUBLIC CLASS COUNSEL”
The starting point for the “public class counsel” concept is the analogy
to the “private attorney general.” Securities laws have long been enforced
through both public and private actions.  The securities acts, in addition14
to giving the SEC enforcement power, have given rise to express and
implied causes of action for private plaintiffs.  This Article envisions the15
field of securities law actions as occupied by two principal categories of
players—the private attorney general and the public class counsel—both
of whom serve deterrent and compensatory functions.
Judge Jerome Frank, a securities law expert who sat on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, coined the term “private attorney
general” to describe litigation by private plaintiffs to prevent a government
official from exceeding his statutory powers: “Such persons, so authorized,
are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals [sic].”  Courts have drawn16
upon the concept to explain the use of private litigation to enforce statutory
and constitutional rights.  Although the phrase has come to mean different17
things to different people, at its core is the concept that private litigation
can enforce public policies.  Private remedies have often been justified as18
serving the dual function of compensation and deterrence on the theory
that, as well as compensating injured investors, payment of damages
promotes the general good of law enforcement by deterring violations.19
The archetypal private attorney general in the securities area is a
profit-seeking counsel who brings a class action with the purpose of
earning fees, and not with the purpose of deterring violations of the
6
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20. The concept of “public class counsel” developed in this Article focuses on the
“entrepreneurial” model (“bounty hunter” model) of private attorney general—the profit-seeking
model described above—because it is characteristic of private securities litigation. Id. at 217–18.
Contrast this type with the “ideological” type: A private attorney general who consciously uses the
private action to pursue a strategy of enforcement and is “typically organized into ‘public interest’
law firms, is financed by foundations or membership donations, and tends in general to be faithful
to, and closely controlled by, the social and political groups that he is serving.” Id. at 235.
21. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 739–41 (“[T]here are two very different
perspectives of the role of private suits in the enforcement of the securities laws: one perspective
enlists plaintiffs as private attorneys general, and the other perspective paints the same plaintiffs
as vexatious litigants.”). See generally Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action
Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593 (2008) (examining the impact of the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005 on plaintiffs’ lawyers).
22. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 218–19; cf. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 772–74 (2008) (finding that actions against customers and suppliers fell
beyond the scope of the 10(b)(5) private right of action).
23. The analogy is helpful, but not perfect. For instance, private damages can deter without
any actor having made a conscious choice to use damages for deterrence, whereas the use of money
penalties for compensation requires the SEC to choose to direct the money to a private party.
24. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 216 n.1 (noting that the concept of the private attorney
relevant statute.  The goal of deterrence does not motivate these attorneys,20
except to the extent that policymakers adjust attorneys’ incentives to fulfill
that purpose. The private securities class action is often loved or hated
depending on whether—or how well—the class and its counsel act as a
“private attorney general,”  and courts have become less willing to imply21
a private right of action when they see a clear gap between the promise of
private enforcement and its practice.22
This Article proposes an analogous model of “public class counsel.”
The basic similarity between the private attorney general and the public
class counsel is that, in theory, both have compensatory and deterrent
functions. Regardless of whether a private attorney general or a public
class counsel brings the action, the beneficiaries of an action are the same.
Injured investors benefit by recovering money and the public, which
includes injured investors, benefits from deterrent effects.  The public23
class counsel could be any governmental actor, whether an enforcement
branch of an agency or an independent office that undertakes actions on
behalf of consumers or employees. It refers to any public actor that obtains
compensation for private parties.
The utility of the public class counsel concept does not rely on
resolving the many normative and descriptive issues about the private
attorney general; instead, the term is intended to be a term of debate that
raises comparable issues concerning public actors who undertake a
traditionally private role. As a term of debate, the concept is open to the
same criticism as that of private attorney general—that it cannot, by itself,
answer the difficult questions about whether private litigation or public
actions deter or compensate.  Nonetheless, the concept of private attorney24
7
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general is essentially a way of asking whether it makes sense to rely on private litigation for public
enforcement).
25. E.g., 36 SEC ANN. REP. 92 (1970) (“[E]nforcement activities . . . encompass the detection
and investigation of possible violations of the Federal securities laws and the taking of appropriate
action to curtail fraudulent and other improper activities.”); 1 SEC ANN. REP. 30 (1935) (“[T]he
Commission has broad powers to enforce the acts and the rules and regulations . . . through
investigations, hearings and injunctions.”).
general has shaped the analysis in many areas of the law over the years
since Judge Frank introduced it. The public class counsel can exert
analogous influence.
In the securities context, the SEC compensates injured investors
through the disgorgement remedy and, since the enactment of the Fair
Fund provision, through distribution of money penalties. Because the Fair
Fund provision made another potentially large category of funds available
for compensation, it signaled the enlargement of the SEC’s public class
counsel role. Identifying the SEC as public class counsel highlights the
hybrid nature of the SEC’s monetary remedies and the pressure this new
compensatory role puts on the relationship between public and private
enforcement of the securities laws. 
Moreover, the idea of public class counsel reaches beyond the
securities context. Envisioning a field as comprising public class counsel
and private attorneys general can bring to the fore new compensatory roles
for public actors. As victim restitution statutes are enacted, for instance,
criminal prosecutors might be characterized as public class counsel
because of their dual function, which may shift the actor’s focus to
deterrence. Other public actors, such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, have long performed this hybrid function,
sometimes choosing individual cases in part because of their deterrent
effect. While this Article focuses on the SEC and its intensified
compensatory role under the Fair Fund provision, the utility of the public
class counsel concept comes in part from understanding these disparate
public actors (SEC, EEOC and others) as being in the same category. The
concept allows comparisons to be drawn more easily and suggests the
variety of ways in which compensation and deterrence interact as goals of
public actors.
III.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE SEC’S ROLE IN COMPENSATING
INJURED INVESTORS
Far from embracing the purpose of compensating individual investors,
the SEC long disclaimed any role as an instrument for private individuals
to recover money. Indeed, the purpose of SEC enforcement was
traditionally described as detecting violations through investigation and
taking steps to prevent or penalize violations.  In the 1970s, the “primary25
function” of the SEC was to “protect the public from fraudulent and other
8
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26. See, e.g., 42 SEC ANN. REP. 108 (1976); Thomas L. Hazen, Administrative Enforcement:
An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Use of Injunctions and Other
Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 449 & n.141 (1979–1980); see also John D.
Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641, 649
(1977) (tracing the development of the disgorgement remedy); cf. 37 SEC ANN. REP. 100 (1971)
(“The Commission’s authority, however, does not extend to arbitrating private disputes or
controversies between brokerage firms and investors or to assisting investors in the assertion of
their private rights.”). 
27. This Article uses the general definition of “money penalty” (or “civil money penalty”)
proposed by the Administrative Conference of the United States: a sanction “(i) classified as civil
and (ii) money that is, in fact, subject to collection by an agency or a court.” Administrative
Conference of the United States, Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, Recommendation 72-6
(1972), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305726.html. Although this Article
does not use the term “fine,” the Senate Report accompanying the Remedies Act used “fine”
interchangeably with “money penalty.” S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 3, 7 (1990) [hereinafter S. REP. NO.
101-337]. The SEC has also used these terms interchangeably on occasion. See, e.g., OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, SEC PERFORMANCE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 20, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/2007budgetperform.pdf.
28. See William H. Lawrence, Judicial Review of Variable Civil Money Penalties, 46 U. CIN.
L. REV. 373, 374 n.2 (1977).
29. Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1456 & n.135 (1979).
30. 71 SEC ANN. REP. 5 (2005). The goal of returning funds to harmed investors first
appeared in the description of the SEC’s goals in the SEC’s first annual report after Chairman Cox
took office. See id.; see also, e.g., 73 SEC ANN. REP. 6 (2007); 72 SEC ANN. REP. 6 (2006); U.S.
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FY 2008 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 5 (Feb. 2007).
unlawful practices and not to obtain damages for injured individuals.”26
The use of money penalties  to compensate injured investors was even27
more unknown. As money penalties became a significant tool for
administrative agencies in the early 1970s, the Administrative Conference
studied their use and recommended ways for federal administrative
agencies to implement their penalty authority.  A commentator involved28
in the study wrote confidently that “[b]y definition, a civil money penalty
does not serve a ‘specific’ compensatory function of making whole an
identifiable individual specifically injured by the offending conduct.”
Rather, the function of this “system of private remedies” was
compensation.29
By 2005, in contrast, the SEC announced that “where possible,” it
intended to “return funds to harmed investors.”  By then, the SEC had two30
main mechanisms for compensating injured investors: distribution of
disgorged funds and, after 2002, distribution of money penalties pursuant
to the Fair Fund provision. 
A.  Disgorgement
Nothing in the 1933 or 1934 Acts or their legislative histories explicitly
gave the Commission the power to seek disgorgement and, in fact, the
SEC did not seek disgorgement in federal court for its first three decades,
9
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31. See Ellsworth, supra note 26, at 642. 
32. SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing cases involving
disgorgement); SEC v. Buntrock, No. 02-C-2180, 2004 WL 1179423, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 25,
2004) (same); REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 2,
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf [hereinafter Fair Fund Report].
Texas Gulf Sulphur was the first case to determine that the court had the power to grant the
ancillary relief of disgorgement, thereby depriving defendants of their profits from insider trading.
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 312 F. Supp. 77, 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
33. Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 102(e), 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-9(e) (2006)) (“In any proceeding in which the Commission may impose a penalty under this
section, the Commission may enter an order requiring accounting and disgorgement, including
reasonable interest. The Commission is authorized to adopt rules, regulations, and orders
concerning payments to investors, rates of interest, periods of accrual, and such other matters as
it deems appropriate to implement this subsection.”).
34. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1995)
(outlining the difficulties of defining the relationship of restitution to unjust enrichment).
35. See Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 3 n.2; Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308
(“Restitution of the profits on these transactions merely deprives the appellants of the gains of their
wrongful conduct.”).
36. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 3; see also SEC v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d
1450, 1475 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The effective enforcement of the federal securities laws requires that
the SEC be able to make violations unprofitable. The deterrent effect of an SEC enforcement action
would be greatly undermined if securities law violators were not required to disgorge illicit profits.”
(quoting SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972))); SEC v. Blavin,
760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The purpose of disgorgement is to force ‘a defendant to give
up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched’ rather than to compensate the victims of
fraud.”).
37. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 3 n.2; see also SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802
(5th Cir. 1993) (“[D]isgorgement is not precisely restitution . . . . Disgorgement does not aim to
compensate the victims of wrongful acts, as restitution does.”); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem.
Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he primary purpose of disgorgement is not to
compensate investors. Unlike damages, it is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount
by which he was unjustly enriched.”).
despite a few earlier instances of obtaining it through settlement.  It is31
now well established that the SEC may seek disgorgement in federal court
as part of the courts’ equitable powers,  as well as in administrative32
proceedings on statutory bases introduced by the Securities Enforcement
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990.33
Much has been written about the difficulties of precisely defining
equitable remedies such as disgorgement and restitution,  and courts34
sometimes use the terms “disgorgement” and “restitution”
interchangeably.  Nonetheless, the remedy of disgorgement is often35
described—and has been described by the SEC—as forcing defendants “to
give up the amount by which they were unjustly enriched.”  The SEC has36
drawn the line between restitution and disgorgement as follows:
“Restitution is intended to make investors whole, and disgorgement is
meant to deprive the wrongdoer of their ill-gotten gain.”  Generally, cases37
about the securities acts do not address the rationale for distributing
10
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38. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937) (“Unjust Enrichment—A person
who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other.” (emphasis added)); DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 4.1, at 223–27
(disgorgement), § 4.2, at 229–40 (history of restitution), § 4.3, at 254–56 (rescission) (1973).
39. See, e.g., SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175–76 (2d Cir. 1997); Huffman, 996
F.2d at 802 (holding that disgorgement was not “restitution” and therefore not a debt under the
Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., because “[d]isgorgement
does not aim to compensate the victims of the wrongful acts, as restitution does”); Blavin, 760 F.2d
at 713 (“Once the Commission has established that a defendant has violated the securities laws, the
district court possesses the equitable power to grant disgorgement without inquiring whether, or to
what extent, identifiable private parties have been damaged by [defendant’s] fraud.”). See generally
5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.2[4][B], 26 (5th ed. 2005)
(discussing when distribution is appropriate).
40. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 4.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. (citing SEC v. Club Atlanta Travel, Inc., Litigation Release No. 17,008 (May 17,
2001) and SEC v. Fuller, Litigation Release No. 16,887 (Feb. 5, 2001) as examples of disgorgement
that did not warrant distribution to investors); see also SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.1102(b) (2008) (“When, in the opinion of the Commission or the hearing officer, the cost of
administering a plan of disgorgement relative to the value of the available disgorgement funds and
the number of potential claimants would not justify distribution of the disgorgement funds to
injured investors, the plan may provide that the disgorgement funds and any civil penalty shall be
paid directly to the general fund of the United States Treasury.”).
disgorged money—measured by the wrongdoer’s gain—to injured
investors. The basic contours of the remedy are not specific to the
securities context, but are part of the court’s equitable powers established
in various contexts over many years.38
Although the disgorgement remedy differs from restitution, disgorged
funds may be distributed to injured investors. Courts have adopted the
view that disgorgement is primarily aimed at deterring violators by
depriving them of profit. On this ground, they have held that the
appropriateness of disgorgement does not depend on the identification of
harmed private parties or the distribution of this amount to those harmed.39
In the securities context, distribution is at the discretion of the court or
the agency, depending on whether the matter is judicial or administrative.
Funds that are not distributed to injured investors go to the U.S.
Treasury.  The SEC has noted that payment to investors of disgorged40
funds “is not always economically feasible.”  When small amounts are41
collected, or when the number of identifiable investors is large in
comparison to the amount collected, for instance, the Commission has
reported that it “routinely” asks the court to direct the disgorged amount
to the Treasury.42
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43. Although calling monetary relief “ancillary” may seem odd now that it has become a
main feature of relief imposed by the SEC and because it often is unaccompanied by the injunctive
relief to which it is ancillary, these terms reflect the many years during which the SEC’s main
remedy was injunctive. Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Secs., Report of the Task Force on SEC
Settlements, 47 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1098 (1992).
44. H.R. REP. 98-355, at 25 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2297; see also
Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Secs., supra note 43, at 1120. Although disgorgement and then
disgorgement plus penalties have been the major sources of investor compensation, the appointment
of a receiver, who often distributes or generates funds for the investors in the company, has also
performed this function. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 753 & n.56. 
45. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 6 (describing the disgorgement order imposed on
Milken for violation of a Commission order barring association with a broker). Disgorgement
amounts may also be large in the post-Fair Fund era. For example, in 2007, AIM Advisors and AIM
Distributors agreed to pay $30 million in civil penalties and $20 million in disgorgement to settle
allegations of market timing of mutual funds. In re AIM Advisors, Inc., Order Approving a
Modified Distribution Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 57,859 (May 23, 2008).
46. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 27.
47. S. REP. NO. 101-337, supra note 27, at 7–9 (“[D]isgorgement requires only that the law
violator give up his unlawful gains and exacts no cost for his actions.”).
48. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil
Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 480 n.14 (1973–1974). The Administrative Conference
encouraged their use, viewing them as useful to “moderate an otherwise too harsh response.”
See Administrative Conference of the United States, Civil Money Penalties as a
Sanction, Recommendation 72-6 (1972), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/
305726.html.
49. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d)(1), 78u(d)(3)(A), 80a-41(e)(1), 80b-9(e)(1) (2006). Besides
giving the SEC the power to seek disgorgement in administrative proceedings as well as court
cases, the Act also enlarged some of the agency’s other powers.
As disgorgement became accepted as an ancillary remedy,  it became43
“an important source of recovery for private plaintiffs” through SEC
actions.  Disgorgement amounts could be quite significant—for instance,44
Michael Milken paid $47 million in disgorgement.  Accordingly,45
distributions to injured investors could also reach these heights. Before
penalties became a source of investor compensation, the Commission
followed a policy of allocating money first to disgorgement, which could
be distributed to injured investors, and then to penalties, which could not.46
B.  The SEC’s Power to Impose Money Penalties: The Remedies Act
By the 1990s, members of Congress began to express discontent with
how well the disgorgement remedy deterred bad actors: disgorgement
simply returned violators to their previous position.  The granting of47
money penalty authority was, in part, a response to this limitation. Many
administrative agencies had obtained the power to impose civil money
penalties in the 1970s,  but the SEC had been left out of that trend. The48
Commission’s broad power to impose money penalties dates only to 1990,
when Congress passed the Remedies Act.  Before then, the SEC could49
12
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50. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(B) (2006) (providing that the SEC can bring an action
for a civil monetary penalty for violation of anti-bribery provisions in the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b)(1)(A) (2006)). See generally Colleen P. Mahoney et al., The
SEC Enforcement Process: Practice and Procedure in Handling an SEC Investigation After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 77-3d C.P.S. CBNA) (outlining the monetary remedies of the SEC before the
passage of the Remedies Act). 
In addition, a little-used section also allows a penalty of $100 a day. See Arthur B. Laby & W.
Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the 1990 Remedies Act: Civil Money
Penalties, 58 ALBANY L. REV. 5, 7 (1994) (noting that Exchange Act Section 32(b) allows a penalty
of $100 a day against an issuer who does not file required reports, although the SEC had invoked
it only once as of 1990); Mercantile Properties, Inc., Litigation Release No. 360 (Aug. 27, 1946)
(invoking section 32(b)). 
51. H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048
(indicating that the SEC needed to “go beyond disgorgement of illegal profits to add the imposition
of a significant fine as a needed deterrent”); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275 (“This legislation provides increased sanctions against insider trading in
order to increase deterrence of violations.”).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(1) (2006) (reaching violators of the securities acts, the “rules or
regulations thereunder, or a cease-and-desist order”). See generally Matthew Scott Morris,
Comment, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990: By Keeping
Up With the Joneses, the SEC’s Enforcement Arsenal Is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151,
153 (1993) (discussing the Remedies Act’s “numerous important and powerful changes to the
federal securities laws”).
53. Annette L. Nazareth, Chairman, Secs. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Commissioner: Remarks Before the SEC Speaks Conference (Mar. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030306aln.htm#foot6; see also S. REP. NO. 101-337, supra
note 27, at 8 (saying that the expanded sanctioning authority, including money penalty authority,
would increase deterrence and enable the SEC to tailor enforcement remedies to the conduct,
whereas the remedies earlier available to the SEC would have been “too severe or, alternatively too
weak”).
54. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
impose penalties only in certain Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cases and,
beginning in the 1980s, in insider trading cases.  50
The 1984 Insider Trading Sanctions Act served, in part, as a trial run
of SEC penalty authority that led up to the broader grant in the Remedies
Act. The legislative history of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
highlighted the need to allow the SEC to fine violators so that it could
effectively deter violations of the securities laws.  Built into the Act was51
a provision directing Congress to revisit the question of whether the SEC
should get broader money penalty authority. The answer, according to
Congress, was apparently “yes.”
In 1990, the Remedies Act expanded the SEC’s penalty authority to
reach most violators of securities laws.  The main purposes of money52
penalties, according to the legislative history of the Remedies Act, were
to give the agency forceful enough tools to deter violators and enough
flexibility to tailor remedies to the violation.  The statute directed that the53
money penalties be paid into the U.S. Treasury.  The SEC could seek54
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101-429, § 101, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77t (d)(3)(A) (2006))
[hereinafter Remedies Act].
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2006) (concerning broker dealers and associated persons), 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (2006) (concerning an associated person), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(2) (2006)
(concerning municipal securities dealers), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(c)(1)(A) (2006) (concerning
government securities dealers), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(c)(3) (2006) (concerning clearing agencies and
transfer agents) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006)); see also § 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789
(1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (2006)); § 203(e)–(f) of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e)–(f) (2006)). See generally
William R. McLucas et al., SEC Enforcement: A Look at the Current Program and Some Thoughts
About the 1990s, 46 BUS. LAW. 797 (1990) (describing the SEC’s penalty power under the
Remedies Act). A proposal to extend the power to impose money penalties against any entity—as
opposed to only regulated entities—in an administrative proceeding never became law. See
Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=
f:h2179ih.txt.pdf.
56. The highest penalties—tier-three penalties—apply when the violation “involved fraud,
deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement” and caused
“substantial losses” or the “risk of substantial losses.” 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d) (2006).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(3)(A) (2006).
58. S. REP. NO. 101-337, supra note 27, at 10.
59. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Secs. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Staff: 24th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute (Apr. 29, 2004), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm; see, e.g., SEC v. Abide, SEC Files Civil
Fraud Action Against Mark P. Abide, Former WorldCom Director of Property Accounting; Abide
Consents to Fraud Injunction and Agrees to Pay Disgorgement, Prejudgment Interest and Civil
Money Penalties, Litigation Release No. 19,776 (July 27, 2006) (announcing SEC settlement with
former WorldCom Director of Property Accounting for charges including insider trading and
imposing $57,947 (plus interest) in disgorgement and a penalty of $57,947), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19776.htm.
money penalties in federal court or against certain directly regulated
entities and individuals such as broker-dealers or in administrative
proceedings against certain directly regulated entities and individuals.  If55
the SEC chose the first route, the Act established a three-tier structure of
maximum penalties, with increasing penalties for increasing culpability.56
A maximum amount per “violation” was specified at each level, and
persons and non-persons were distinguished, with non-persons receiving
a higher maximum fine at each tier.57
The court also had the option of imposing a penalty equal to the
defendant’s “gross amount of pecuniary gain,” which the Senate Report
defined as the “amount by which the defendant was unjustly enriched as
a result of the violation.”  Therefore, in actions in federal court, the58
disgorgement amount may be the yardstick for the penalty amount. This
practice mirrored a common remedy under the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act: disgorgement of trading profits (or losses avoided) plus a penalty
equal to the disgorgement amount.59
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60. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.1002 (2008) (calling for the
adjustment of civil monetary penalties for inflation pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement
Act of 1996).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c) (2006).
62. See Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 101, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77t (d)(3)(A) (2006)).
63. SEC v. DiBella, 409 F. Supp. 2d 122, 131–32 (D. Conn. 2006) (rejecting a challenge to
the SEC’s pre-Sarbanes-Oxley power to seek disgorgement and reviewing the legislative history).
See generally Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Secs., supra note 43, at 1097, 1118 & n.178 (arguing
that the legislative history of the Remedies Act supports the survival of these remedies).
64. H.R. REP. 101-616, at 31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1389.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c) (2006). Other factors are whether the act or omission “involved
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement;” the
extent of unjust enrichment, “taking into account any restitution made to persons injured by such
behavior;” whether the person has previously violated federal or state securities laws or rules of a
self-regulatory organization; “the need to deter such person and other persons from committing
such acts or omissions;” and “such other matters as justice may require.” Id. 
66. SEC v. Lybrand, 281 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Remedies Act directs
A separate provision of the Remedies Act enabled the SEC to seek
money penalties against certain entities and individuals through an SEC
administrative proceeding. Again, the Act established a three-tier penalty
structure with maximum penalties for each “act or omission” that increase
as the conduct becomes more culpable.  The statute directs the60
administrative law judge to decide whether to impose a money penalty
(and in what amount) by determining, with reference to six permissive
factors, whether imposition of money penalties would further the “public
interest.”61
The Remedies Act included no provision dealing directly with investor
compensation, or suggesting that investor compensation was or should be
a goal of the Commission. As noted above, the Act directed that penalties
be paid to the U.S. Treasury.  In addition, while disgorgement—the62
traditional source of SEC-distributed investor compensation—continued
to be available,  the legislative history emphasized that disgorgement was63
aimed at deterrence, not compensation. The House Report stated: “In
contrast to damages granted in private actions, which are designed to
compensate the victims of a violation, disgorgement ‘is a method of
forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly
enriched.’”64
Investor harm under the Remedies Act was simply a factor that helped
judges or the agency gauge the egregiousness of the violation, the
culpability of the conduct and actor, and the social harm that needed to be
deterred. So, for example, one of the factors ALJs may consider when
deciding whether money penalties would be “in the public interest” is the
harm to other people resulting from the act or omission.  When the SEC65
seeks money penalties in federal district court, similar judicially developed
factors include “whether defendants’ conduct created substantial losses or
the risk of substantial losses to other persons.”  66
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courts to determine a civil penalty “in light of the facts and circumstances” of the particular case.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i) (2006). General factors that courts look to in imposing those penalties
include “(1) the egregiousness of the violations at issue; (2) defendants’ scienter; (3) the repeated
nature of the violations; (4) defendants’ failure to admit to their wrongdoing; (5) whether
defendants’ conduct created substantial losses or the risk of substantial losses to other persons; (6)
defendants’ lack of cooperation and honesty with authorities, if any; and (7) whether the penalty
that would otherwise be appropriate should be reduced due to defendants’ demonstrated current and
future financial condition.” Lybrand, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 730 (emphasis added). 
67. SEC v. Moran, 944 F. Supp. 286, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also SEC v. Credit Bancorp,
Ltd., No. 99 Civ. 11395, 2002 WL 31422602, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2002); SEC v. Coates,
137 F. Supp. 2d 413, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); SEC v. Kenton Capital Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17
(D.D.C. 1998).
68. See Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 101, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77t (d)(3)(A) (2006)).
69. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006)).
In sum, under the Remedies Act before passage of the Fair Fund
provision, disgorgement continued to be the main source of investor
compensation obtained by the SEC, while money penalties were directed
to the U.S. Treasury and served the traditional purpose of deterrence.
C.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Fair Fund Provision
Courts and Congress had described the Remedies Act penalty power in
terms of the traditional goals of civil fines: “punishment of the individual
violator and deterrence of future violations.”  The passage of the67
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 brought a new twist, changing the disposition
of the money penalties so that the penalties began to serve the dual
purpose of deterring potential violators of the securities laws and
compensating harmed investors. Whereas until then any civil money
penalties had been required to be paid into the U.S. Treasury,  the Fair68
Fund provision of Sarbanes-Oxley allowed penalties paid in enforcement
actions to be added to disgorgement funds and paid to the injured
investors:
Civil penalties added to disgorgement funds for the relief of
victims. If in any judicial or administrative action brought by
the Commission under the securities laws . . . the
Commission obtains an order requiring disgorgement against
any person for a violation of such laws or the rules or
regulations thereunder, or such person agrees in settlement of
any such action to such disgorgement, and the Commission
also obtains pursuant to such laws a civil penalty against such
person, the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion
or at the direction of the Commission, be added to and
become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of the
victims of such violation.  69
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70. Id.
71. The SEC is responsible for monitoring all Fair Funds, regardless of whether they are
created through administrative or judicial proceedings. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
REP. NO. GAO-07-830, SEC: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS
ADDRESS LIMITATIONS IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OPERATIONS 14 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07830.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT 1].
72. Id. at 13.
73. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 754.
74. See id.; Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 34 (noting the disgorgement prerequisite and
recommending that the Fair Fund provision be amended either “to permit the Commission to use
penalty monies ordered in a particular manner for distribution to injured investors in that matter
regardless of whether disgorgement was ordered . . . or . . . to permit the Commission to apply
penalties paid by any defendant in a case to a disgorgement fund if at least one defendant in the
same or related case was ordered to pay disgorgement”).
75. See Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 34 (giving the example of SEC v. Acacio,
Litigation Release No. 17,292 (Jan. 2, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr17308.htm).
76. According to the General Accounting Office, internal SEC guidance recommends seeking
such nominal disgorgement to trigger the Fair Fund provision. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-05-670, SEC AND CFTC PENALTIES: CONTINUED PROGRESS MADE IN
COLLECTION EFFORTS, BUT GREATER SEC MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED 28 (2005),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_109/109-GAO-05-670.pdf [hereinafter GAO
REPORT 2].
77. E.g., Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 22 (“The Commission intends to use the
provision whenever reasonably possible, consistent with its mission to protect investors.”); see also
72 SEC ANN. REP. 6 (2006); 71 SEC ANN. REP. 4, 58 (2005).
The Commission decides at its discretion whether penalties are used to
compensate investors: the Fair Fund provision directs that money penalties
“shall” be added to a disgorgement fund for distribution to injured
investors “on the motion or at the direction of the Commission.”  In one70
way, the provision is fairly broad in its reach, as it can be invoked in
judicial or administrative actions,  whether resolved in an order or71
settlement, and the provision does not distinguish between penalties
against individuals and entities.  A penalty amount may be distributed to72
investors, however, only if ordered against a defendant against whom there
is also a disgorgement order—a disgorgement order against a co-defendant
does not suffice.  As the SEC and commentators have pointed out, this73
prerequisite may limit investor compensation by preventing distribution
in cases where disgorgement is inappropriate;  for instance, when an74
issuer commits financial fraud but does not profit from it.  To an extent,75
though, this result may be avoided by ordering nominal disgorgement in
addition to penalties, as SEC internal guidance seems to advocate.76
The Commission has announced that it will distribute the money to
injured investors whenever possible,  although it may choose to direct77
penalties to the U.S. Treasury when penalties are small in comparison to
17
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78. See Adoption of Amendments to the Rules of Practice and Delegations of Authority of
the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49412, 66 Fed. Reg. 13,166, 13,173 (Mar. 12,
2004) (“Allowing monies that otherwise would go into a Fair Fund to be paid to the Treasury where
investors would receive only de minimis distributions will prevent those monies from being
consumed by administrative costs, although at a cost to victims who might have received a minimal
payment from a Fair Fund.”); It’s Only Fair: Returning Money to Defrauded Investors: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 10 (2003) [hereinafter It’s Only Fair]
(statement of Rep. Richard H. Baker, Chairman, Subcomm.) (“At the current time, if the award or
penalty is small in relation to the number of investors and it is not practical to make a meaningful
distribution, money still is returned to the treasury, as opposed to being used internally.”). 
79. See Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 14.
80. SEC v. McAfee, Inc., SEC Sues McAfee, Inc. for Accounting Fraud, McAfee Agrees to
Settle and Pay a $50 Million Penalty, Litigation Release No. 19,520 (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec. gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19520.htm.
81. See id.; see also Settlement Notice, In re Network Assocs., Inc. II Secs. Litig., No.
CV-00-4849-MJJ (N.D. Ca. 2001), available at http://scas.issproxy.com/pdf/27416-12475set.pdf.
82. See, e.g., In re Nevis Capital Mgmt., LLC, Order Making Findings and Imposing
the number of injured investors.  This policy continues the pre-Fair Funds78
practice of directing disgorgement amounts to the U.S. Treasury rather
than to injured investors based on a similar calculation of economic
feasibility.79
The practical effect of the provision depends on how the SEC elects to
exercise its discretion. The amount investors recover under the Fair Fund
provision depends further on two sets of choices made by the agency: (1)
the size of the penalties and (2) whether the money is offset against private
recoveries or cumulative with private recoveries. Why penalty amounts
matter is straightforward. When distributed to injured investors, higher
penalties reduce losses more than lower ones. Moreover, small penalties
may not be used for compensation because distribution is not
cost-effective.
Rules about offsets determine how much the investors recover from a
defendant where private and public actions are brought based on
substantially the same violations. Take, for example, the actions against
McAfee. McAfee was a computer software company that settled with the
SEC to charges of overselling its product to distributors, secretly paying
them to hold the extra inventory, and sometimes using a wholly-owned
subsidiary to repurchase the excess from distributors.  A private action80
against McAfee settled for $70 million, and an SEC action imposed a
$50-million penalty, which the agency earmarked for distribution to
investors.  Whether the two figures are combined or offset makes a big81
difference in what the injured investors recover—their portion of $120
million (if combined) or $70 million (if offset). Since the Fair Fund
provision, some consent decrees include a provision in which settling
companies agree not to offset penalty amounts paid to the SEC against
damages paid out by the defendant in any related private actions.  Under82
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Remedial Sanctions and Cease-and-Desist Order, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,214, at
10 (Feb. 09, 2004) (The respondent agreed not to “benefit from any offset or reduction of any
investor's claim by the amount of any Fair Fund distribution to such investor in this proceeding that
is proportionally attributable to the civil penalty paid by [the] Respondent” and to pay the Treasury
or a Fair Fund any offsets or reductions granted by a court in a private action.); In re Banc of Am.
Secs. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 55,466, at 16 (Mar. 14, 2007).
83. Statement of the Securities & Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties,
SEC News Release, (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
84. 2 JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK § 26:3.2, at 26-9 (Practising
Law Institute 2003) (citing Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Secs. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Chairman: Remarks before the U.S. Department of Justice Corporate Fraud Conference (Sept. 26,
2002), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch585.htm); Press Release, House Comm. on Fin.
Services, Baker Proposes FAIR Account to Return Funds to Defrauded Investors (July 17, 2002),
http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=release&id=151.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006).
86. Id. § 7246(c).
87. Id.
88. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 36.
89. Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th
Cong. (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_
cong_bills&docid=f:h2179ih.txt.pdf.
90. The co-sponsors in addition to Representative Oxley were Representatives Sue Kelly,
Doug Ose, David Scott, and Patrick Tiberi. See id.
this offset rule, injured investors in the McAfee example would receive a
portion of $120 million rather than of $70 million. 
As the Commission has pointed out, the legislative history of the Fair
Fund provision is “scant.”  It was added to the bill during the conference83
process, apparently proposed by Representative Richard Baker,
Republican of Louisiana, and co-sponsored by Representative Michael
Oxley, Republican of Ohio.  The function of the Fair Fund provision—to84
permit the SEC to make another category of monetary relief available for
distribution to injured investors—and the text’s reference to “the relief of
victims” indicate that its purpose was to compensate injured investors.85
Another section of the Fair Fund provision is more explicit about this goal.
Part of the provision required the SEC to study five years of enforcement
actions to identify when these actions might be used to “efficiently,
effectively and fairly provide restitution for injured investors” and to
analyze other methods to further the aim of investor restitution.  The86
provision directed the SEC to use its findings “to revise its rules and
regulations as necessary” and suggest legislative or regulatory action that
would address its concerns.  The resulting report reiterated that87
“[r]eturning funds to investors is an important Commission objective.”88
The goals of investor compensation were even more prominently
featured in proposed follow-on legislation: The Securities Fraud
Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003.  This bill was introduced89
in the House in May 2003 by Representative Baker and five co-sponsors,
including Representative Oxley,  but never became law. Apart from its90
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91. See id. (identifying “State Attorneys Limitation of Power bill” as an alternative “popular”
title); see also The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003: Hearing on
H.R. 2179 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th Cong. (2003); Christopher R. Lane, Halting
the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts Between State and Federal Securities
Regulators, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 318–19 (2005) (describing the controversy over the bill);
Gretchen Morgenson, Bill to Limit Oversight of Wall St. Gains, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2003, at C2.
92. For instance, it proposed eliminating the requirement that the penalty be obtained against
the same defendant against whom disgorgement was ordered, and eliminating the need for separate
actions for money penalties and cease-and-desist orders. Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor
Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:h2179ih.txt.pdf.
93. GAO REPORT 2, supra note 71, at 2. See generally GAO REPORT 1, supra note 76.
94. See Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 1 (“[T]he Fair Fund provision should increase
the funds available to investors injured as a result of violations of the federal securities laws.”).
Disgorgement too continued to be an option after the enactment of the Fair Fund provision, as
suggested by the provision’s reference to the continuing existence of disgorgement orders and
disgorgement funds (to which penalty amounts may be added). Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006)).
Furthermore, the statute explicitly authorized the Commission to seek “any equitable
relief”—presumably including disgorgement—“that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit
of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006) (authorizing equitable relief “[i]n any action or
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws”).
95. 73 SEC ANN. REP. 26 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar
2007.pdf. 
96. Id. at 18. The same year, the SEC ordered approximately $1.6 billion in disgorgement
and penalties. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, SEC PERFORMANCE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008, 157, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/2008budgetperform.pdf [hereinafter 2008
BUDGET].
97. GAO REPORT 2, supra note 76, at 5.
controversial provisions preempting some state regulation,  the bill91
proposed increasing penalty amounts ten-fold and endorsed many of the
revisions to the Fair Fund provision that the SEC had proposed in the Fair
Fund Report.92
Implementation of the Fair Fund program has not been easy. For
instance, the General Accounting Office has repeatedly reported that
distribution of funds under the Fair Fund provision has been limited and
that the SEC Enforcement division had “not developed adequate systems
and data to fulfill its oversight responsibilities.”  Nonetheless, the Fair93
Fund provision has increased the amounts the SEC can distribute to
compensate investors by allowing penalties as well as disgorged profits to
be used.94
The SEC collected approximately $8 billion in disgorgement and
penalties in the first five years the provision was in effect.  In 2007, the95
SEC distributed $176.8 million to the Treasury and $580.5 million to
injured investors.  As of June 2007, $1.8 billion of the $8.4 billion96
ordered since 2002 had been distributed.  As of June 2008, the SEC had97
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98. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces $26 Million Fair Fund Distribution in Banc of
America Securities LLC Settlement (June 23, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
118.htm.
99. For instance, 55% of disgorgement and penalties ordered was collected in 2007 and 88%
was collected in 2006, although the percentage varies widely from year to year. 73 SEC ANN. REP.
30 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2007.pdf. 
100. Coffee, supra note 17, at 218.
101. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006)). There must also be an order of disgorgement against the
person. Id.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(1) (2006) (reaching violators of the securities acts, the “rules or
regulations thereunder” or a cease-and-desist order). See generally Morris, supra note 52.
103. A strict reading of the language of the Fair Fund provision suggests that cases in which
distributed more than $3.9 billion.  Although the difficulties of98
collection  and distribution mean that not all funds designated for injured99
investors will reach them, these figures suggest that the amounts have the
potential to be quite high. 
After the passage of the Fair Fund provision, the SEC may distribute
all of the money it collects, whether as disgorgement or money penalties,
to injured investors. As compensation emerges as a potentially important
part of the SEC’s role, the functions of the private attorney general and the
public class counsel increasingly overlap.
IV.  DOES INVESTOR COMPENSATION EVER MAKE SENSE?
The concept of the private attorney general, as Jack Coffee has pointed
out, is at its core a way of asking “to what extent can we sensibly rely on
private litigation as a mechanism of law enforcement?”  The concept of100
public class counsel raises a parallel policy issue: to what extent can we
sensibly rely on public enforcement as a mechanism of victim
compensation? This Part of the Article and the next address two questions
that arise about compensation: first, whether compensating injured
investors is ever a worthwhile goal and, second, if so, which entity or
mechanism should be used to obtain compensation. 
To answer these questions, it is useful to identify the types of actions
that could give rise to a monetary penalty. The Fair Fund provision does
not differentiate among types of payors or actions. It provides that, when
the SEC obtains a penalty against a person, “the amount of such civil
penalty shall, on the motion or at the direction of the Commission, be
added to and become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of the
victims of such violation.”  The Remedies Act, which established the101
SEC’s broad power to impose civil monetary penalties, gave the SEC
penalty authority that reached most violators of the securities laws.  The102
consequence of the Fair Fund provision and the broad penalty authority
read together is that almost any violator of the securities laws could be the
source of a money penalty distributed through a Fair Fund.  103
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no one was unjustly enriched and, accordingly, no disgorgement order is appropriate, should not
give rise to distributions under the Fair Fund provision. See § 308 of Sarbanes-Oxley (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006)) (“If . . . the Commission obtains an order requiring
disgorgement . . . and the Commission also obtains pursuant to such laws a civil penalty against
such person, the amount of such civil penalty shall . . . become part of the disgorgement fund.”).
So, although almost any securities law violator may be the source of a money penalty, a violation
where an individual made no profit may not give rise to disgorgement, and thus Fair Funds may
not be triggered. The disgorgement requirement may not impose significant limits, however,
because most SEC matters are settled. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office, Rep. No.
GAO-03-138, Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses,
and Remaining Challenges (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf; U.S.
Gov’t. Accounting Office, Rep. No. GAO-06-678, Financial Restatements: Update of Public
Company Trends, Market Impacts, and Regulatory Enforcement Activities (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06678.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT 3]. Treating these consent
decrees as contracts, courts often respect the monetary relief agreed to by the parties, regardless of
whether it complies with the statutory language and regardless of the difficulties of showing the
appropriateness of disgorgement in an adjudicated matter. See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165,
1178–79 (2d Cir. 1989).
104. See John C. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and
its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556 (2006).
105. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 889 (2007).
106. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 36.
The key distinction for addressing whether compensation of injured
investors makes sense is between issuers that cause harm in the secondary
market for their stocks, and other securities law violators. In the
secondary-market example, the investor purchases stock from another
shareholder in the secondary market and alleges that the issuer’s
misleading statement or omissions caused the price to be inflated.  Many104
of the highest-profile cases fall into this category. In fact, this type of
violation motivated the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Enron and WorldCom
involved issuer fraud and reporting violations in which the gain to the
defendant was a small portion of the amount of losses caused to investors.
This Part examines two critiques of compensation that apply both to
private attorneys general and to the SEC and other public actors. After
addressing the problem of low investor recovery, it turns to the concern
that the notion of compensation as a transfer from a wrongdoer to a victim
often does not hold when corporations and their shareholders are
involved.  Both critiques apply with most force in the issuer context.105
A.  Low Investor Recovery
The SEC has characterized the Fair Fund provision as “an innovative
device that the Commission intends to use to return more funds to
investors.”  Returning more money to investors should not be confused106
with making investors whole, however. As the Commission has reported,
in many cases, penalties “reduce,” but do not eliminate, “losses to injured
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107. 2008 BUDGET, supra note 96, at 157; see also Adoption of Amendments to the Rules of
Practice and Delegations of Authority of the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49412,
66 Fed. Reg. 13,166, 13,173 (Mar. 12, 2004) (stating that, under the Fair Fund provision, investors
“are more likely to be made whole”) (emphasis added); Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 755–56
(“It is unlikely that profit disgorgements generated by the Fair Fund provision can be expected to
displace private recoveries in many situations . . . . Even though these [penalty and disgorgement]
sums can be considerable, . . . this amount can pale when compared to the harm proximately caused
by the defendants’ violation.”).
108. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 20–21.
109. See generally GAO REPORT 3, infra note 103, at 162.
110. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
111. Final Judgment as to Monetary Relief at 2, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 531
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 02-CV-4963), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom/wcjudg
070703.pdf.
112. WorldCom Victim Trust, http://www.worldcomvictimtrust.com (providing an official
website for the SEC’s program to distribute the proceeds of the WorldCom case to investors) (last
visited Sept. 19 , 2008).
113. Id. (noting, as of September 2008, that the administrator had completed claims with
eligible losses of more than $12 billion).
114. Id.
115. Stephanie Plancich et al., Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs., Recent Trends in Shareholder
Class Actions: Filings Return to 2005 Levels as Subprime Cases Take Off; Average Settlements
Hit New High 14 (2007), http://www.nera.com/image/BRO_Recent_Trends_12-07_web_3_
parties.”  In particular, investor fraud and reporting cases “may cause107
investor losses that dwarf, by several orders of magnitude, any profit that
the violators may have made.”  These actions, like private securities class108
actions, return a small percentage of the losses to investors.  109
WorldCom is an apt example of an issuer fraud that caused investor
harm far exceeding the penalty amounts. The district court estimated the
loss to shareholders as $200 billion.  In the action brought by the SEC,110
the court imposed a money penalty of $2.25 billion, which was ultimately
reduced to $750 million in bankruptcy.  To explain why injured investors111
recovered only a small percentage of their losses—listed (unsurprisingly)
among the “Frequently Asked Questions”on the claims website—the fund
administrator told claimants that “investors lost money in WorldCom’s
fraud on a vast and unprecedented scale,” including “more than $145
billion on WorldCom stock alone and tens of billions more on bonds and
other securities.”  According to the fund administrator, the $750 million112
penalty, although “a very significant amount,” allowed payment to victims
of “only a fraction of the total eligible losses.”  To be more precise,113
injured investors recovered only 5.5% to 6% of their losses.114
Investors recover low percentages of their losses in both private and
public actions. Whether they receive more in one or the other depends in
part on sheer amounts and in part on costs, an issue that the next Part
addresses. In the private securities class action, the median investor
recovery in 2007 was only 2.4% of investor losses.  In some of the major115
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FINAL.pdf (finding that the median investor recovery, calculated by comparing settlement amounts
to investor losses, was 3.1% in 2005, 2.4% in 2006, and 2.1% in 2007, and noting that settlement
size has increased, but the percentage of investor recovery has decreased). This figure overstates
the percentage, as it is calculated before any costs of distribution and other costs are deducted from
the settlement amount. See also Coffee, supra note 104, at 1545.
116. Coffee, supra note 104, at 1543 tbl.3.
117. See Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 101, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2006)); see also S. REP. NO. 101-337, supra note 27, at 10 (explaining
that gross pecuniary gain meant the “amount by which the defendant was unjustly enriched as a
result of the violation”).
118. WorldCom was one such case. The district court estimated the maximum penalty in that
case was $10 to $17 billion, the amount “that the company [had] gained from its fraud.” SEC v.
WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
119. The closest the statute comes to defining “violation” is in the context of a cease-and-
desist order, but this passage is unhelpful because it adds the additional concept of “offense.” See
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(D) (2006) (“In an action to enforce a cease-and-desist order entered by the
Commission . . . each separate violation of such order shall be a separate offense, except that in the
case of violation through a continuing failure to comply with such an order, each day of the failure
to comply with the order shall be deemed a separate offense.”). See generally 25 MARC I.
STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT
§ 6:9 n.7 (2d ed. 2001).
120. Barry W. Rashkover, Comment, Reforming Corporations Through Prosecution:
Perspectives from an SEC Enforcement Lawyer, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 537 (2004).
121. GAO REPORT 3, supra note 103, at 162 (noting that most SEC enforcement cases settle);
Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the 1990 Remedies Act:
Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALBANY L. REV. 5, 21 (1994); Harvey J. Goldschmid, Report in Support
of Recommendation 72-6: An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties
scandals where both private and public actions were brought, private
damages were several times greater than the public penalty.116
At first glance, the explanation for lower public recoveries seems to lie
in statutory limits on SEC penalty amounts. The Remedies Act formally
caps the penalties at $50,000, $250,000, and $500,000 for entities at the
three tiers. However, these caps are unlikely to impose a meaningful limit
on public recoveries for at least three reasons. First, under the Remedies
Act, one possible measure of the maximum penalty for an action in federal
court is the “gross amount of pecuniary gain.”  In some cases the117
maximum may be so high that it provides little practical limit to the
penalty that the agency might seek or impose.  Second, even when gross118
pecuniary gain is not the measure, the tiered penalties in the Remedies Act
are maximums per “violation,” a key term that the statute does not
define.  Large penalties may be justified by arguing that massive frauds119
within large, complex entities result in many violations. In fact,
commentary by the SEC staff—although not representing agency
policy—called the per-violation penalty a “formula[] that, when applied
to widespread misconduct, can result in billion-dollar-plus penalties in
mega-financial fraud cases.”  Third, most SEC enforcement actions are120
resolved through consent decree.  Although settlements of civil court121
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as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 896, 899 (July 1, 1970–Dec. 31, 1972),
quoted in William H. Lawrence, Judicial Review of Variable Civil Money Penalties, 46 U. CIN. L.
REV. 373, 374 n.2 (1977).
122. See, e.g., WorldCom, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 436 (“A Court reviews such a settlement
proposal not on the basis of what it might itself determine is the appropriate penalty but on the basis
of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate . . . . Moreover, where one of the settling
parties is a public agency, its determinations as to why and to what degree the settlement advances
the public interest are entitled to substantial deference.” (internal citations omitted)); 1 KENNETH
B. WINER & SAMUEL J. WINER, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT: COUNSELING AND DEFENSE § 17.08
(2007).
123. SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1178–79 (2d Cir. 1989) (“A consent judgment, though
it is a judicial decree, is principally an agreement between the parties [and, as such,] ‘should be
construed basically as contracts, without reference to the legislation the Government originally
sought to enforce but never proved applicable through litigation.’” (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1975))).
124. SEC v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., SEC Charges ConAgra Foods, Inc. in Financial Fraud and
Accounting Case, ConAgra Agrees to Pay $45 Million Penalty to Settle Charges, Litigation Release
No. 20,206 (July 25, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20206.htm.
cases must be approved by the federal district court as “fair, reasonable,
and adequate,” deferential standards of review apply.  Moreover, courts122
often respect the contractual terms to which the parties have agreed,
regardless of whether the relief complies with the statutory language.  So123
we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the lower public
recoveries, perhaps to political constraints or budgetary limitations on the
SEC.
Particularly in issuer fraud and reporting cases, low investor recovery
brings into question the compensatory rationale for actions brought by
both private attorneys general and public class counsel. It may have more
force as a critique of the SEC because historically the agency has had
lower recoveries than its private counterparts.
B.  The Circularity Critique
Whether investor compensation ever makes sense depends not only on
the amount of recovery, but also on the source of the compensation. For
the SEC, the answer depends on the source of SEC-imposed monetary
penalties. 
The Enron and WorldCom matters are well-known and heavily
litigated examples of the “issuer” or “secondary market” case, but they are
only the most prominent of a whole category of actions. One of many
other examples is ConAgra Foods, Inc., which agreed to pay a $45-million
penalty to the SEC to settle charges that it had engaged in improper
accounting practices.  The SEC has announced its intention to distribute124
this penalty through a Fair Fund to injured investors—investors who
engaged in secondary-market transactions that were affected by the
25
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125. Id.
126. Coffee, supra note 104, at 1556–57.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1558.
129. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1502 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives
“Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate
Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 633 (2007) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Corporate Executives] (“For diversified, active investors, the gains and losses
will . . . tend to net out over time” because an investor has “roughly the same likelihood of being
the lucky beneficiary of a fraud as its victim.”); Letter from Donald C. Langevoort, Thomas
Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., to Christopher Cox, Chairman,
U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://fortunelegalpad.files.word
press.com/2007/11/chairman-cox-sec-letter.pdf [hereinafter Langevoort, Letter].
130. Some recent commentators have contradicted the accepted wisdom, offering reasons that
some investors, both diversified and undiversified, actually suffer compensable losses. See Alicia
Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 225 (2007). Others have
suggested that compensation may be appropriate in special circumstances—for instance, where the
Enron employees were urged to invest all of their retirement funds, undiversified, in Enron stock.
Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 129, at 634–35.
issuer’s misstatements.  The issuer case can be contrasted with SEC125
penalties imposed on others, including individuals such as officers,
directors, and third parties such as accountants, lawyers, and banks.
The distinction between the issuer case and others is important because
it has become conventional wisdom among securities law scholars that
compensation from an issuer does not make sense because of a circularity
problem. When a corporation pays compensation, the current shareholders
indirectly bear the costs; the compensation goes to holders of shares within
the time period in which material misinformation allegedly affected the
market.  Accordingly, compensation in these circumstances amounts to126
a wealth transfer between shareholders, none of whom is culpable.127
Furthermore, diversified investors may both receive and pay compensation
because they are current shareholders (paying the penalty) and also were
shareholders during the relevant period (receiving compensation, minus
administrative costs).  Finally, in the aggregate, diversified investors are128
not harmed: they are just as likely to gain from fraud as to lose from
fraud.  This circularity critique of compensation is not limited to the129
public class counsel context (that is, when a public entity obtains
compensation). Instead it reaches any action to compensate victims of
securities fraud in the secondary market, and, in fact, has been articulated
primarily in the context of private securities class actions.
Although evaluating this accepted wisdom is beyond the scope of this
Article,  this Article does reach the issue of whether, despite the130
circularity critique, the SEC is an appropriate mechanism even in the
secondary-market case. It does so in part because compensation for
26
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131. On this point, I agree with Professor Alicia Davis Evans that “as a practical matter,
political exigencies make achieving the end of shareholder compensation in the post-Enron era
unlikely” and that, accordingly, “what is most appropriate . . . is an exploration of ways to provide
compensation more effectively and efficiently.” Evans, supra note 130, at 225–26.
132. It’s Only Fair, supra note 78, at 1 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Baker).
133. Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Sue W. Kelly).
134. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 174–75 (1997); Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 129, at
628–29 & nn.7–8.
135. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 104, at 1569–70.
investor losses seems to be a political reality unlikely to be eliminated.131
The Fair Fund provision’s history and the rhetoric surrounding its passage
support this conclusion. Nowhere is the goal of compensation questioned;
instead, supporters of the legislation framed it as an issue of fairness.
When describing the purpose of the Fair Fund provision, Representative
Baker likened the payment of SEC money penalties into the U.S. Treasury
to “the call to the sheriff’s office when you report your car stolen, the
sheriff calls you back two days later and says, ‘Good news, we found the
car; bad news is, I am keeping it.’”  Representative Kelly likewise132
appealed to basic fairness: “By establishing that fund, we said that
wrongdoers are going to be punished and that every effort is to be made to
make the people who have been victimized whole.”133
Moreover, even if the conventional wisdom were correct that
compensation of injured investors by issuers is rarely an appropriate
independent goal, that concession does not end the analysis of whether the
Fair Fund provision and, through it, the assignment to the SEC of a public
class counsel function are socially useful for some other reason. For
instance, the provision arguably enhances deterrence by making large
penalties more palatable because injured investors are their beneficiaries.
Here the analogy to the private attorney general holds: as some scholars
and lawmakers have discarded or questioned the compensatory rationale
for private securities class actions, deterrence has emerged as a possible
justification.  Finally, and most significantly, penalties obtained from134
issuers are not the only possible source of Fair Funds. Fair Funds can be
created from money penalties gathered from any violator of the securities
laws, as long as disgorgement is also ordered. In other words, penalties
imposed on individuals (e.g., officers or directors) and third parties (e.g.,
banks) are also eligible for distribution to injured investors. Compensation
funded by penalties against individuals gives rise to less of a concern with
circularity because the penalties transfer wealth from the culpable to the
victim. This point reduces but does not eliminate the concern with
circularity because the existence of indemnification and insurance often
means that the corporation bears the costs of actions and penalties against
individuals, either through indemnification or through higher insurance
premiums.135
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136. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177,
190–91 (1994) (rejecting a reading of § 10(b)(5) that would allow a private cause of action for
aiding and abetting a § 10(b)(5) violation in the context of an indenture trustee for bond issues); see
also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773–74 (2008) (finding that
actions against customers and suppliers exceeded the scope of the § 10(b)(5) private right of
action).
137. See, e.g., SEC v. Gardner, Former KPMG Consulting Principal Settles SEC Charges for
Role in Peregrine Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 20,449 (Feb. 6, 2008) (settling charges
that a former KPMG principal and managing director aided and abetted a financial fraud at a
software company by signing sham license agreements and signing a false audit confirmation, and
imposing an $80,000 financial penalty).
138. John C. Coffee, Corporate Securities: Memo to Congress: Reform and Its Perils, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 15, 2007, at 5.
139. Coffee, supra note 104, at 1562.
140. Id. at 1556–57 (distinguishing between “non-trading issuers” and issuers in the primary
market context).
141. Id. at 1556.
Fair Funds might also be funded through recoveries from third parties,
such as banks  and consultants or auditors.  Using penalties imposed on136 137
aiders and abettors as the source of Fair Funds reduces the concern about
the circularity critique because actions against aiders and abettors are
essentially suits against  third parties.  Unlike penalties against an issuer138
in the secondary-market context, victims do not fund the compensation of
other victims. Instead, a third-party wrongdoer internalizes the harms it
has caused to innocent shareholders, an effect more akin to entity liability
in the tort context.  Notably, the circularity critique is not entirely139
eliminated by focusing on aiders and abettors. If the aider or abettor is a
publicly held corporation, diversified investors may both receive
compensation as victims and pay the penalty because they own shares in
the aider or abettor. 
For simplicity, this Article contrasts “issuers” (the secondary-market
case) with “non-issuers” (e.g., individuals and third parties). However, the
story is more complicated. For instance, issuers and their shareholders who
benefit from misstatements do not fit comfortably into either camp. One
such example is the primary market case in which the issuer has sold its
shares and may benefit.  This Article does not include this scenario in the140
“issuer” category, but rather treats it separately as an intermediate case
between the issuer/secondary-market case and non-issuer cases because
the wealth transfer is not exclusively victim to victim. Instead, some
shareholders benefited from the conduct, so transferring money from them
to innocent shareholders is less troubling.141
In sum, the SEC should take into account the circularity critique of
compensation in the secondary-market case and prioritize distribution of
penalties where this effect is less of a concern, such as those cases against
individuals and aiders and abettors.
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142. Other commentators have explored this issue. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at
755–57; see id. at 779 (“[E]ven after the enactment of the Fair Fund provision, the SEC is not
armed in most instances with authority to recover from the wrongdoers sums equal to those that can
be recovered in private suits. Thus, even when there is a SEC enforcement action, the private suit
provides a more encompassing remedy for the injured investors.”); Ellsworth, supra note 26, at 651
(describing the SEC’s resource constraints).
143. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 20 (“The ability of investors to fully recover their
losses . . . may largely depend on the use of private actions. Further, courts have recognized that
the Commission’s limited resources may oblige it to prosecute only the most ‘flagrant abuses,’ and
that private actions complement Commission enforcement action and allow for the fullest investor
recovery.” (footnotes omitted)).
144. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 777, 779 n.113.
145. See Coffee, supra note 104, at 1543.
V.  SHOULD THE SEC COMPENSATE INJURED INVESTORS?
Assuming that in some circumstances compensation of injured
investors makes sense, or that compensation is a political fact of life, the
second question about compensation is which entity or mechanism should
secure it and, in particular, whether (or when) the SEC is a better means
than the private securities class action. This Part considers what is special
about compensation obtained by the SEC as public class counsel.
The starting point is to evaluate whether all responsibility for
compensating injured investors could be transferred from the private sector
to the SEC. For several reasons, the SEC is unlikely to be able to take over
the compensatory role from private litigants. The limited resources of the
agency and the immense size of investor harm in comparison to the
monetary relief obtained by the SEC make it unlikely that the SEC can
supplant private actions.  The SEC has suggested this itself in the Fair142
Fund Report.  Coverage of the private action extends beyond the SEC’s143
reach: empirical work has found that only 15% of the settled private
securities fraud class actions in a pre-2002 sample had a parallel SEC
action.  Moreover, sanctions imposed in private securities class actions144
overwhelm those in actions by the SEC.  Finally, even someone145
convinced of the efficacy of investor compensation would not be satisfied
by replacing the private action, which has compensation as a primary aim,
with actions by an agency where compensation is one of many competing
goals. So it seems unlikely that the SEC should, or could, take over this
compensatory function entirely.
The more difficult question is whether SEC actions could complement,
rather than replace, private actions. One can imagine the field of securities
enforcement and compensation for securities law violations as occupied
by private attorneys general and public class counsel, each with dual
functions (compensation and deterrence). Just as we think of private
actions as having the potential to complement public deterrence, in theory,
public actions could complement private compensation.
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146. Black, supra note 12, at 338 (noting that Republican sponsors of Sarbanes-Oxley and
Commissioner Atkins have “asserted that actions under section 308 provide better value than
private securities fraud suits because investors’ recoveries are not reduced by attorney’s fees”).
147. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in
Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 931–32 (1983) (making this point in the context of
disgorgement). 
148. Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 744.
149. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
150. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2006)
(requiring registered companies to maintain adequate books and records); see also Securities
Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008) (outlining net capital requirements of
brokers). See generally Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 744. 
This Part concludes that, even assuming that compensation of injured
investors is sometimes appropriate, using the SEC to compensate investors
makes sense only in limited circumstances. First, it makes sense when no
private action is available either practically or legally. Second, where both
private and public actions are available, pursuing compensation through
the SEC might make sense when the costs of obtaining and distributing
compensation are significantly lower in an SEC action than in a private
one and a mechanism exists for coordinating private and public actions to
take advantage of the lower costs and avoid cost duplication. One rationale
for the Fair Fund provision was that it avoided attorney’s fees.  This Part146
examines the countervailing costs and identifies some costs that are shifted
rather than avoided by assigning the SEC a compensatory role.
A.  SEC Compensation When No Private Right of Action Exists
If any investors should be compensated, the SEC is the “best” entity to
do so when it is the only one; that is, when the only possible recovery is
through an SEC action.  That a private action is “unavailable” might147
mean either that, as a practical matter, no private attorney would undertake
the representation or that, as a legal matter, no private right of action
exists. 
A cause of action might be practically unavailable when too little
money is at stake for a private attorney to undertake the case, when
developing or supporting a case is difficult, or when standing requirements
or statutes of limitation block the private plaintiff.  At least when the148
amounts at stake are unattractively low, these cases are unlikely to be a
source of SEC-distributed compensation. The SEC has announced that it
is unlikely to distribute small amounts, particularly when they are low in
comparison to the number of injured investors.149
What remains are causes of action that are legally unavailable to
private plaintiffs. Some of the actions available only to the SEC, such as
actions for books and records violations, do not result in money damages
or do not have an obvious injured party, and so are unlikely to trigger
compensation.  However, one target stands out as a potentially150
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151. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994) (referring to § 10(b) of the Securities and Exhange Act of 1934).
152. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 768–69 (2008)
(“The decision in Central Bank led to calls for Congress to create an express cause of action for
aiding and abetting within the Securities Exchange Act . . . . Congress did not follow this course.”).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006) (creating aiding and abetting liability in SEC actions but not
in private actions).
154. See generally 128 S. Ct. at 766–73 (interpreting the congressional response to Central
Bank). 
155. Id. at 766.
significant source of investor compensation: aiders and abettors of
securities fraud. Unlike the books-and-records example, violations by
aiders and abettors of securities fraud are more likely to result in money
damages and have an identifiable injured party. Moreover, the cause of
action belongs solely to the SEC. The Supreme Court’s decision in Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., rejected a
reading of 10(b)(5) that would allow a private cause of action for aiding
and abetting a 10(b)(5) violation.  This decision triggered a debate in151
Congress as to whether it should pass legislation permitting such a private
cause of action.  Congress ultimately responded by confirming (or152
reinstating, depending on the interpretation of Central Bank) the SEC’s
power to pursue actions for aiding and abetting and declining to establish
a private right of action.153
Central Bank left open questions, some of which were resolved in
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.  In Stoneridge154
Investment Partners, the Court found that actions against customers and
suppliers were beyond the scope of the 10(b)(5) private right of action.155
For the purposes of how the SEC should prioritize the creation of Fair
Funds, the Stoneridge case is important because it signals a restrictive
reading of private causes of action under 10(b)(5), leaving the SEC as the
actor who can pursue compensation from aiders and abettors of securities
fraud. 
This category of cases is also potentially important in light of the
circularity critique. Using penalties imposed on aiders and abettors as the
source of Fair Funds reduces the concern that compensation is, in some
circumstances, circular. If compensation is disfavored in the secondary-
market context because of its essential circularity, a potential source of
deep pockets—non-trading issuers—is eliminated. Aiders and abettors
may have deep pockets (e.g., banks and other entities). Even putting aside
the circularity critique, these deep pockets may be the only ones available
to fund investor compensation when an issuer is insolvent. In sum, the
“easy case” for invoking the Fair Fund provision is when no private action
is available. Seen in conjunction with the circularity critique, aiders and
abettors stand out as an important category for the SEC’s exercise of its
discretion under the Fair Fund provision.
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156. Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 738.
157. See id. at 777, 779 n.113.
158. The General Accounting Office has similarly noted both that this data is not being
collected and that it should be. See GAO REPORT 1, supra note 71, at 29 (“Enforcement does not
collect key data, as we recommended in 2005, to aid in division oversight of the Fair Fund
program.”).
159. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 21 (describing a succession of legislation motivated by
mistrust of class-action lawyers).
160. Ted Frank, Op-Ed., Arbitrary and Unfair, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2007, at A14
(suggesting, as a member of the American Enterprise Institute, that the Fair Fund provision allows
“one [to] help investors without paying billions to the likes of [plaintiffs’ lawyers]”). 
B.  SEC Compensation When Private and Public Actions Are Available
So far this Part has looked at matters in which only the SEC can
recover for injured investors. However, securities laws have long been
enforced through both public and private actions, which sometimes
overlap.  In fact, a recent study suggests that in 55% of SEC enforcement156
actions studied by the SEC in the Fair Fund Report, parallel private suits
were brought.  When both public and private actions are available,157
compensation through an SEC action may make sense if it is “cheaper”
and, if so, if it replaces the private action in that instance rather than
simply duplicating the compensatory mechanisms and associated costs. 
This Part provides a framework for analyzing the costs of SEC actions,
both the distribution and collection costs in an individual action and the
systemic costs of asking the SEC to undertake the public class counsel
function. It also suggests that more reporting and study of the costs is
needed.  Given that SEC actions are unlikely to be able to replace private158
actions altogether, it suggests that it only matters that an SEC action is
cheaper if a mechanism is in place for the SEC to replace the private
action. In the absence of assurance that the costs of SEC compensation are
low or coordination of private and public actions, the compensatory
rationale for the Fair Fund provision weakens whenever a private action
is also available.
The Fair Fund provision should be seen against the backdrop of
congressional restrictions on private actions, driven by Congress’ concern
that these actions are frivolous and benefit only the plaintiffs’ bar.  In the159
Fair Fund context, some commentators have argued that compensation by
the SEC, rather than by private actors, is desirable because it avoids
attorneys’ fees: proposing, for instance, that “[t]hese ‘Fair Funds,’ while
suffering from bugs of government bureaucracy, are still more efficient
and fair than the contingency fees of up to 30% to trial lawyers.”  This160
assertion might be elaborated into an argument that the public class
counsel should replace the private attorney general where possible to
maximize the fairness and efficiency of investor compensation. The
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161. Id. 
162. GAO REPORT 1, supra note 71, at 6, 14. Although, as enforcement officials acknowledge,
this information is a key piece of assessing the costs of implementing this provision, it is not being
tracked, although an information system is reportedly in development. See id. at 6.
163. Proposed Distribution Plan, In re AIM Advisors, Inc., Admin. Proceeding File No.
3-11701, 1, 2 (June 25, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56027.htm (follow
“Proposed Distribution Plan” hyperlink) [hereinafter AIM Plan].
164. Id. at 2–4, 6, 8.
165. GAO REPORT 1, supra note 71, at 14.
166. AIM Plan, supra note 163, at 3, 5, 8.
167. GAO REPORT 1, supra note 71, at 29 n.39. See, e.g., SEC, Claims Fund, In re Strong
Capital Mgmt., http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims/strongcapital.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2008). Strong Capital Management paid for the “Independent Distribution Consultant.” Id. While
problem is that the Fair Fund provision includes no directive about
administration, and the “bugs of government bureaucracy”  are never161
quantified.
In a private action, a settlement payout will include the costs of
distribution, which might come out of the fund or be paid separately by the
payor, and legal fees, which will come out of the fund. When the SEC
brings an action, its costs fall in the same categories: the administrative
costs and the “attorney fees.” The first category is similar for both public
and private actors in the nature of the costs (e.g., consultants) and who
bears the cost (injured investors or payor). The nature of the “attorney
fees” differs, however. In the public case, these are the costs of having the
SEC undertake this compensatory role. Unlike the attorney fees in a
private action, which are taken out of the fund, the costs of assigning the
SEC a compensatory role are borne more broadly by taxpayers. All of
these costs should be considered when choosing whether a public or
private action is the best means to investor compensation.
In any single action, administrative costs include payment to
consultants, known as Independent Distribution Consultants or IDCs, who
design and administer Fair Fund plans.  For instance, in 2007, AIM162
Advisors and AIM Distributors agreed to pay $30 million in civil penalties
and $20 million in disgorgement to settle allegations of market timing of
mutual funds.  The resulting $50 million Fair Fund was implemented163
through a “Twenty-Five Step Process” that involved an IDC, an
“economic, financial and management” consulting firm, a law firm, a fund
administrator, a tax administrator, and an escrow agent.  This pattern of164
required consultants is typical of SEC-ordered Fair Funds.165
Some of these costs are borne by the payor. In the AIM example, the
distribution plan called for AIM to pay the Fund Administrator and IDC,
while the fund paid the tax administrator.  The GAO found that 70% of166
Fair Fund distribution plans provide that administrative expenses are paid
with fund proceeds, while in 30% the sued entity or individual bore the
administrative costs of the Fair Fund.  These costs are not unique to SEC167
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in theory these administrative costs might be accounted for in the process of bargaining the penalty
and disgorgement amounts, the use of round numbers (or prominent solutions)—the $50 million
penalty, for instance—suggests that they are not, or at least that they are not being used in a precise
way.
168. The concern about duplication assumes some fixed costs that do not depend on the size
of the settlement. It is worth noting that the SEC has on occasion added the money tagged for
distribution under Fair Funds to an existing private class-action fund, avoiding the duplication of
distribution costs, but that is not universal practice. See 72 SEC ANN. REP. 23 (2006) (“[W]here
appropriate, the SEC seeks to save costs by distributing funds together with related private class
actions.”).
169. The provision requires an accompanying order of disgorgement and states that the money
penalties will be “added to disgorgement funds for the relief of victims.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006)).
170. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
171. 73 SEC ANN. REP. 27 (2007).
172. Id.
173. GAO REPORT 1, supra note 71, at 6, 28 (“[D]uring peak periods [the Fair Fund workload]
can consume about 50 to 75 percent of a staff attorney’s time.”).
as opposed to private actions; they would have been incurred in a private
action as well. The concern is that parallel distributions may duplicate
administrative costs when both private and public actions are brought for
the same conduct against the same actors.168
Notably, the Fair Fund administrative costs exist despite the fact that
the Fair Fund provision is couched as simply adding money to existing
disgorgement funds,  which presumably already have administrative169
expenses. The creation of a new distribution office at the SEC indicates
that Fair Funds involve new tasks. Furthermore, because passage of the
Fair Fund provision was accompanied by an increase in the numbers and
size of penalties, distributions are larger and maybe more frequent, both
because of how the agency exercises its discretion to distribute these funds
and because distribution of smaller amounts is not cost-effective.170
Accordingly, the disgorgement prerequisite does not avoid new costs
associated with Fair Funds.
In addition to the costs of administering funds, the SEC has had to
divert resources to the distribution function. For instance, in 2007, the
percentage of timely enforcement actions (those brought within two years
of opening the investigation) was the lowest in five years.  In explaining171
this result, SEC officials cited the “significant resources” the agency
devoted to “the SEC’s responsibility to distribute Fair Funds to injured
investors” and to “establish[ing] and support[ing] an accounting and
recordkeeping system to appropriately track these distributions.”172
Enforcement officials complained that the decentralized administration of
Fair Fund plans “diverts investigative attorneys from their primary law
enforcement mission”  and have reported that coordination with the IRS173
and the Department of Labor about taxation of the distributions and about
ERISA issues have resulted in delayed distribution and devotion of staff
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174. Id. at 26–27.
175. 73 SEC ANN. REP. 30 (2007); GAO REPORT 1, supra note 71, at 30. Heads of the office,
Richard D’Anna and Lynn Powalski, were appointed in February 2008. Press Release, SEC, SEC
Chairman Cox Announces Creation of New Office, Appointment of Leaders, to Expedite
Distribution of Billions to Injured Investors (Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/
2008-12.htm; Karey Wutkowski, SEC Forms Oiffice to Pay Back Wronged Investors, REUTERS,
Feb. 5, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN054378522008025.
176. 73 SEC ANN. REP. 30 (2007); GAO REPORT 1, supra note 71, at 8.
177. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-
Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 147–49, 155 (2007).
178. Evans, supra note 130, at 226.
179. Fair Fund Report, supra note 32, at 27. This is not to say that penalties will always be
favored. For instance, disgorgement may be the only monetary relief available if the statute of
time.  Partially in response to these concerns, in early 2008 the174
Commission formed and staffed a new office to handle Fair Fund
distribution: the Office of Collections and Distributions.  The agency has175
also invested in a new computerized tracing system.176
When evaluating these costs, possible countervailing benefits of these
structures should be weighed. For instance, the tracking system may
streamline enforcement procedures. Furthermore, once in place, the Fair
Fund mechanism and its growing apparatus may be used to further other
goals, as some recent scholarship has recommended. It might, for instance,
serve as the basis for whistleblower bounties  or the beginnings of an177
investor insurance fund.178
While, at first glance, the Fair Fund provision should affect primarily
distribution costs because it greatly increases the agency’s role in
distributing compensation, costs of collection should also be considered.
Moreover, collection costs under Fair Funds should be compared both to
SEC collection costs before Fair Funds and to the costs of private
collection. More empirical research is needed, but the Fair Fund provision
may actually lower the costs of collection for the SEC in comparison to
pre-Fair Fund collection to the extent that the SEC begins to prefer money
penalties over disgorgement. After Fair Funds, the SEC can allocate to
either category without affecting the funds’ availability to injured
investors. That means that the agency can choose which remedy to pursue
for other reasons, including costs of collection. The collection procedures
that apply to these two remedies differ and collection of penalties may be
less expensive or quicker. The SEC made this point in the Fair Fund
Report, contrasting the collection methods for disgorgement to those for
penalties and concluding that 
[b]ecause under the Fair Fund provision, all monies recovered
from either the disgorgement or penalty proceeding can be
returned to investors, the Commission has greater flexibility
to choose the most advantageous remedy. For example, an
action to recover penalties in some cases could provide a
quicker means to capture limited assets . . . .  179
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limitations has run. See SEC v. Dibella, 409 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding that
the statute of limitations did not apply to disgorgement because it was “strictly remedial” and did
not qualify as a “civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2462).
180. The SEC’s concern with limiting rights of potential fund beneficiaries is reflected in the
rules that govern proceedings before the SEC. Rule 1106 of the SEC’s Rules of Practice provides
for comments to be submitted as part of the plan approval process, but states that “no person shall
be granted leave to intervene or to participate or otherwise to appear in any agency proceeding or
otherwise to challenge an order of disgorgement or creation of a Fair Fund” or its distribution plan
or individual eligibility for disbursements. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND
RULES ON FAIR FUND AND DISGORGEMENT PLANS 107 (Jan. 2006, corrected Mar. 2006).
181. Brief of Appellant at 13, Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom v. SEC,
467 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 04-4710).
182. Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, 467 F.3d at 83 (“Deterrence is also the SEC's goal
in seeking civil penalties, and the Fair Fund provision does no more than permit civil penalties
subsequently to be distributed in the same way as disgorged profits.” (internal citations omitted));
SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, 2004 WL 1621185, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004)
(rebuffing attempts made by potential claimants to challenge the way the funds are distributed).
The SEC’s enforcement action in WorldCom resulted in two judicial opinions concluding that
compensation of injured investors had been (under disgorgement-only), and remained, a secondary
purpose of the agency. The WorldCom court reasoned that the Fair Fund provision merely
“mention[s]” compensation, which provided insufficient grounds for determining that the agency’s
“role in distributing funds to injured investors” had changed. Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom,
467 F.3d at 83. Relying on the fact that the Fair Fund provision is discretionary rather than
mandatory, the court further held that “the fact that the SEC is not required to distribute Fair Fund
proceeds to injured investors belies the Committee’s assertion that the Fair Fund provision makes
compensation the primary purpose of the distribution.” Id.
183. Rory C. Flynn, SEC Distribution Plans in Insider Trading Cases, 48 BUS. LAW. 107, 108
(1992). 
To compare these to private collection costs requires more information
about the amount of costs, who bears the costs, and the risks of duplication
in the context of parallel private and public actions.
In addition to distribution and collection costs, the Fair Fund provision
introduces a risk of side litigation over who has the rights to a Fair Fund.180
It does so because it introduces the possibility that funds gathered as
money penalties but distributed to injured investors should be treated as
equivalent to private damages. For instance, WorldCom creditors had
challenged the Fair Fund distribution plan in that case, arguing in part that
the deferential standard of review adopted in disgorgement case law was
inapposite because disgorgement had a deterrent purpose while penalties,
under the Fair Fund provision, had the purpose of compensating victims
of securities fraud.  The court ultimately rejected the contention that the181
passage of the Fair Fund provision changed the SEC’s compensatory
role.  Nonetheless, as has been said about disgorgement funds before182
them, Fair Funds are pots of money that may attract claimants (and
potential litigants) “like flies to honey.”183
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184. See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 129, at 635 (describing the critique
of entity liability that “executives themselves will not be deterred from misconduct when their
personal gain from perpetrating or concealing the fraud exceeds the impact they would suffer
should the corporation have to pay”).
185. 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979),
the Court, while declining to revisit the holding of Borak, also refused to read Borak “so broadly
that virtually every provision of the securities Acts gives rise to an implied private cause of action.”
Commentators frequently cite Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), as effectively abandoning Borak
without actually overruling it.
186. Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 17, at 218 & 220 n.8.
187. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433; see also Coffee, supra note 17, at 218, 220 n.8.
188. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 12, at 757 & n.75 (reviewing the agency’s resource
constraints).
In addition to these costs, the introduction of compensation as a
possible goal of the SEC gives rise to the concern that the compensatory
goal will cause either overdeterrence or underdeterrence of securities law
violations. It might overdeter if the SEC were to pursue penalties that
compensated injured investors but were not needed for deterrence. For
instance, a penalty against a corporation may be inappropriate for
deterrence because it does not reach the wrongdoer  or because the184
corporation has already done everything the regulator wants it to do, but
nonetheless the conduct caused great harm and the corporation is a
potential deep pocket for investor compensation. In those circumstances,
a choice to impose a penalty because of its compensatory effect would
overdeter. Alternatively, the SEC might underdeter if penalties were
foregone because they could not be used to compensate investors. Either
one represents a cost to the SEC’s law enforcement role.
There are also policy reasons to limit the SEC’s compensatory role
based on differences between the private attorney general and public class
counsel. The private attorney general is valued in part for the transfer of
some of the burden of enforcement from the resource-constrained
government to the resource-rich private sector. For instance, in J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak,  the Court relied on the idea that “[p]rivate185
enforcement . . . provides a necessary supplement” to public law
enforcement.  It reasoned that a private right of action should be implied186
“to make effective the congressional purpose” at least in part based on the
sheer volume of proxy statements the SEC had to examine a year, which
limited the review it could perform.187
This rationale simply does not hold for the public class counsel. In fact,
the effect is the opposite: transferring the responsibility for investor
compensation to the SEC can be viewed as a transfer from the
resource-rich private sector to the resource-constrained public. Arguably,188
the SEC has other, non-monetary resources that could be leveraged on
behalf of injured investors—more investigative powers or lower
37
Winship: Fair Funds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
1140 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
189. See Ellsworth, supra note 26, at 650 & n.57; Lon E. Musslewhite, The Measure of the
Disgorgement Remedy in SEC Enforcement Actions: SEC v. MacDonald, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 138,
158–61 (1984) (describing how the SEC distinguishes its enforcement actions from private
recovery actions in order to avoid problems involved in private litigation).
190. The Supreme Court ruled against the Federal Trade Commission because of such
concerns in the context of an early attempt by the FTC to step in to resolve a dispute between two
individuals: “[T]he mere fact that it is to the interest of the community that private rights shall be
respected is not enough to support a finding of public interest. To justify filing a complaint the
public interest must be specific and substantial.” FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929); see also
Ellsworth, supra note 26, at 649 (“The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a federal agency
vested with authority to protect the public interest can use that authority to act primarily for the
benefit of a wronged individual.”).
191. See William L. Cary, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REV. 857, 860–61 (1962) (“[W]e must
weigh the extent to which a regulatory agency like the SEC should bring restitution proceedings
for private parties.”); see also Dent, supra note 147, at 931–32 (arguing that SEC actions to
compensate individuals when effective relief is already available through a private action “reduces
the SEC to little more than a collection agency, contrary to the intentions of Congress”).
information costs, for instance. That point, however, runs into the problem
that convergence between the SEC’s remedies and private remedies may
undermine arguments that the agency’s powers and legal standards for its
actions should differ from those available in private actions, gradually
eliminating exactly these non-monetary resources.189
A second difference between the concepts of private attorney general
and public class counsel suggests another reason to limit the SEC’s
compensatory role: the private attorney general represents the injured
investors and also benefits a larger class—the public. When the SEC acts
as public class counsel, in contrast, it represents the public and also
benefits the injured investors, a smaller class of the public. Another way
of thinking about this point is to identify who pays private counsel and
who pays the agency. Private counsel is paid by injured investors through
a cut of the settlement money, money that would otherwise have gone to
the class. The SEC is paid out of funds gathered from taxpayers. So the
private action, according to the private attorney general theory, provides
a more general benefit from a private transaction, whereas when the SEC
compensates investors, taxpayers as a group fund a service that allows
particular injured investors to collect money while avoiding their full share
of the costs of obtaining the compensation.  190
This concern with allocation of costs is captured by another term used
to describe the SEC when it used the disgorgement remedy to compensate
investors pre-Fair Funds. SEC Chairman William Cary expressed
misgivings about turning the SEC into a private collection agency.  The191
concept evokes the concern that when the SEC compensates investors,
taxpayers as a group fund a service—the “collection agency”—that allows
injured investors to collect money while avoiding their share of the costs
of collection. The concept of public class counsel, however, has analytical
advantages over the “collection agency.” Collection agencies typically
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participate in an action only once it has been determined that someone has
a right to collect a particular amount of money from someone else. They
do not decide who owes what to whom and in what amount, but rather
specialize in extracting the money—a single purpose, uncomplicated by
multiple functions. With this limited function, the “collection agency”
does not capture the issues at the heart of the SEC’s emerging
compensatory role, which are the hybrid nature of the SEC’s monetary
remedies and the relationship between public and private enforcement of
securities laws.
The final point about the costs of assigning the SEC a public class
counsel role is that, even if the SEC action were less costly than private
ones, or the action were preferred because of who bears the costs (i.e.,
taxpayers as a whole) or who gets the money (i.e., not plaintiffs’ lawyers),
the problem of coordinating public and private actions remains. Even
where the SEC route to compensation is preferable, the distribution
mechanism and costs may simply be duplicated absent coordination
between private and public actions. Currently no such distribution
mechanism exists. Actions may overlap and, with the exception of
“global” settlements, once one action reaches settlement, the other actions
are not precluded. One way to coordinate is for the SEC to exercise its
discretion under the Fair Fund provision by disfavoring compensation
when it is already available through a private action.
This Part has outlined the types of costs that should be considered when
evaluating whether compensation should be obtained by the private
attorney general or by the public class counsel. While more
information-gathering would be useful, these costs suggest that the SEC
should prioritize distributions when a private action is unavailable because
doing so avoids the problem of duplicated administrative costs and the
unmet need for coordination between public and private actions.
VI.  CRITERIA FOR CREATING A FAIR FUND
This Part suggests that the SEC prioritize distributions under Fair Fund
to minimize concerns with circularity and with the potential duplication of
costs when both public and private actors pursue the same matter. This
Article concludes that the SEC should prioritize distribution of penalties
gathered from aiders and abettors and other non-issuers. It also describes
the most problematic category of distribution: distribution of penalties
against issuers (the secondary-market case) when private and public
actions are both available. This Article suggests the following hierarchy:
1. Distribution of penalties against non-issuers when only the
SEC has a cause of action.
 
2. Distribution of penalties against non-issuers when either
a private or public action is available.
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192. The Government Accounting Office has made similar recommendations. E.g., GAO
REPORT 1, supra note 71, at 29 (“Enforcement does not collect key data, as we recommended in
2005, to aid in division oversight of the Fair Fund program.”).
193. See supra Part IV.B. Circularity is less of a concern when issuers, such as issuers in the
primary market, benefit from the misstatement. See supra Part III.B. 
194. See supra notes 151, 154–55 and accompanying text.
3. Distribution of penalties against issuers (secondary-market
case) when only the SEC has a cause of action. 
4. Distribution of penalties against issuers (secondary-market
case) when either a private or public action is available.
In addition, this Article joins others in concluding that the SEC is unlikely
to be able to take over the compensatory role altogether, and in
recommending that the costs of SEC actions under the Fair Fund provision
be further tracked and analyzed.192
First, the recommended focus on aiders and abettors can be stated more
generally to encompass any distribution to injured investors of money
penalties paid by non-issuers in an SEC action where the cause of action
is available only to the SEC. By excluding penalties obtained from issuers
for harms in the secondary market, this type of distribution reduces the
concern that compensation of injured investors in the secondary market
amounts to transfers among different categories of injured investors, or
from one investor’s pocket to another’s (minus administrative costs), or
that diversified investors cannot be said to have suffered a harm because
their risk of being on the losing side of a transaction is the same as their
risk of being on the winning side.  Because in this category of cases the193
SEC’s discretion to create a Fair Fund would be exercised only when no
private action is available, such distribution also avoids the concern that
parallel public and private actions will simply duplicate costs, and
collection and distribution mechanisms. 
Non-issuers include individuals such as officers and directors, third-
party individuals such as individual lawyers and auditors, and third-party
entities. Money penalties against aiders and abettors are a potentially
significant source of SEC-obtained investor compensation. As noted
above, the Supreme Court restricted private actions against aiders and
abettors in Central Bank and confirmed these limits in Stoneridge, and
Congress has stepped in to preserve the SEC’s right to bring such an
action.  Accordingly, actions against aiders and abettors are squarely in194
the SEC’s domain. Creative lawyering will likely result in other types of
private actions against alleged aiders and abettors, particularly those with
deep pockets, but, after the Supreme Court’s decisions, duplicate actions
are not at issue. Compensation funded by aiders and abettors transfers
money from third parties to injured investors, largely (but not entirely)
avoiding the circularity problems inherent in the secondary-market case.
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195. Langevoort, Letter, supra note 129.
Finally, to the extent that meaningful compensation requires deep pockets
to fund investor recoveries, aiders and abettors—especially entities—may
have the necessary resources.
Second, the SEC should look to penalties against non-issuers when
either a private or public action is available. When the SEC distributes
penalty money obtained for violations outside the secondary-market case,
it avoids the circularity critique for the reasons detailed above. However,
the agency must still be concerned about the duplication of costs in parallel
private and public actions and the absence of mechanisms to address this
duplication. Any time that a private action is available as well as the SEC
action, more needs to be known about the comparable costs (read broadly
to include costs to the SEC’s other goals, especially that of deterrence) of
the two alternatives. In addition, to take advantage of lower costs, if any,
public and private actions need coordination, which is currently absent. In
the terms of this Article, the field of securities enforcement can be
envisioned as occupied by public class counsel and private attorneys
general. At the moment, their actions overlap without coordination. As a
group of prominent scholars conveyed in a letter to the SEC, “the
Commission must become more engaged in discussions about the
workings of private securities litigation: there is an inevitable and growing
overlap between private recoveries and fair fund distributions, which has
to be reconciled.”  It may be addressed in part through the SEC’s195
exercise of its discretion under the Fair Fund provision.
Third, distribution of penalties against issuers when a private action is
unavailable raises the problem of whether it is ever reasonable to
compensate investors injured in the secondary market using penalties
imposed against issuers. This Article takes the critique seriously, arguing
it should influence the priorities of the SEC when it considers
distributions, but also suggests that the political reality of compensation
and the search for deep pockets in light of large investor harm may keep
compensation by issuers on the agenda and on the list of the SEC’s
priorities.
Penalties in the secondary-market case when only an SEC action is
available and the penalties outside the secondary-market context when
private and public actions are available each avoids one of the critiques.
Duplication of costs is an issue where the public and private actions are
both available. Circularity is a problem when an issuer supplies the
penalty. The order in which these two sources of penalties should be
prioritized depends on which of these problems—circularity or cost
duplication—seems more intractable. Underlying the order this Article
suggests is the idea that the circularity problem is more fundamental and
that costs are susceptible to both study and adjustment.
Fourth, the most problematic category is distribution of penalties
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against issuers where private and public actions are available. This type of
distribution suffers from circularity and potential cost duplication. This
type of distribution is particularly troublesome absent coordination of
public and private actions and a mechanism to ensure that the
administrative costs of collection and distribution are lower in SEC actions
than in private ones.
VII.  CONCLUSION
Through the Fair Fund provision, Congress has assigned to the SEC a
newly intensified public class counsel role, which should be recognized
and scrutinized. The analogy between public class counsel and private
attorney general helps answer the narrow question of when the SEC should
exercise its discretion to create a Fair Fund and use money penalties for
victim compensation. This Article proposes that the SEC prioritize
distributions to minimize two concerns about compensating injured
investors: the circularity critique and the duplication of costs. Aiders and
abettors of securities fraud are a potentially important source that meets
both criteria.
On a broader level, although this Article has focused on the SEC’s role
as public class counsel in the context of the Fair Fund provision, the
concept of public class counsel has applications beyond the securities
context. The concept may describe criminal prosecutors in the context of
victim restitution statutes as well as other public actors assigned the dual
functions of compensation and deterrence. Identifying these disparate
actors as being in the same category allows easier comparison and
identifies multiple models for pursuing both compensation and deterrence.
Beyond that, the concept triggers important questions about these public
actors. As soon as we acknowledge the role of public class counsel, we can
ask “Counsel to whom?”, “Who is the class?” and other questions worth
asking.
Finally, this snapshot of the SEC’s remedial authority at the beginning
of this century implicates larger questions about whether a public agency
should be in the traditionally private business of compensating injured
investors. As the analogy between the private attorney general and the
public class counsel suggests, the SEC’s increasingly significant
compensatory mechanisms put pressure on the balance between private
and public enforcement of securities laws. This Article maps necessary
first steps towards addressing the underlying policy question: the extent to
which we can sensibly rely on public enforcement for victim
compensation. The concept of public class counsel offers a much-needed
way to frame the debate.
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